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In the Sttpretne Cottrt of the 
State of lTtah 
AMY ELIZABETH McKEE 
OSTLER GREENER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THOMAS RICHARDSON GREENER 
and JAMES AFTEN GREENER, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE 
NO. 7265 
Counsel for the appellant has made a statement of 
facts With which we cannot entirely agree. Plaintiff filed 
suit against the defendant Thomas Richardson Greener for 
divorce and as an incident thereto asked for the reinstate-
ment of certain funds which had been on deposit in certain 
banking institutions in the joint names of plaintiff and • de-
fendant until a few days prior to the filing of the complaint 
(R. 2-5). 
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After the defendants had been served with several or-
ders to show cause and had subsequently filed their motion 
to strike (R. 26), which said motion was granted (R. 97), 
plaintiff and appellant entered her second amended com-
plaint (R. 33-42) in which the several banks in which the 
funds involved in this suit were on deposit were included 
as parties defendant. Subsequently th~ case was dismissed 
as to all of said banks and banking institutions heretofore 
mentioned, and we feel it unnecessary to make further ref-
erence to these banks and banking institutions, except as 
they may appear in connection with the discussion of the 
merits of the case. 
An answer was filed on behalf of the defendants Thom-
as Richardson Greener and James Aften Greener in which 
the defendant Thomas Richardson Greener also included a 
cross complaint for divorce (R. 105-108). To this answer 
and cross complaint plaintiff filed a reply (R. 109-110), and 
on the 17th day of May, 1948, the case came to trial on its 
merits before the Honorable Wm. Stanley Dunford, Judge 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah Coun-
ty. After hearing the court issued its memorandum de-
cision (R. 115-124), made its findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law (R. 147-151), and entered its decree on August 
26, 1948, denying the plaintiff a divorce and holding that 
the funds in question are the sole funds of the defendant 
Thomas Richardson Greener and are being held in trust 
by the defendant James Aften Greener for the use and bene-
fit of the said Thomas Richardson Greener, and ordering 
the release of said funds to the defendant (R. 152). 
Subsequent to the entry of the decree an order was 
made upon stipulation of counsel releasing the sum of 
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$1624.31 on deposit in the Springville Bank in the account 
of James Aften Greener to Elmer L. Terry, one of the coun-
sel for the defendants, as trustee, for certain uses ( R. 145-
146) . This sum has now been depleted in accordance with 
the orders of the court, to a balance of $624.31. There will 
be another $100.00 withdrawn from said account on the 
23rd of January, 1949, pursuant to said order, which will 
leave a balance as of January 23, 1949, of $524.31. The 
balance of the funds, by stipulation of counsel, were or-
dered deposited in time accounts in four separate banks 
in Utah County (R. 154). These accounts, in· the total sum 
of $18,271.08, have been reduced by the following sums: 
$600.00 to plaintiff's counsel for attorneys' fees on appeal, 
$86,80 costs of transcript for plaintiff, $80.82 costs of print-
ing plaintiff and appellant's brief, $400.00 to apply on at-
torneys' fees for defendants' attorneys, and $43.40 costs 
of transcript for defendants, leaving a balance in saiq time 
accounts of $17,062.87. 
The foregoing are all of the funds involved in this pro-
ceeding, notwithstanding reference to other and different 
amounts mentioned by counsel for appellant in his brief. 
The plaintiff and the defendant Thomas Richardson 
Greener, hereinafter referred to as Greener, prior to the 
filing for divorce as above set out, were residents of Spring-
ville, Utah County, Utah. The plaintiff is -a woman of the 
age of 65 years (Tr. 40), and Greener was 81 years of age 
January 13, 1949 (Tr. 112). Both the plaintiff and Greener 
had been previously married, and both had raised families 
by previous spouses, and all of the children have reached 
their majority. 
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4 
For some time prior to the marriage of plain tiff and 
defendant, which marriage took place in Salt Lake City 
on the 2nd day of October, 1946 (Tr. 10), the plaintiff and 
the defendant Greener kept company together and various 
conversations were had concerning Greener's ability to pro-
vide for the plaintiff. Among other things Greener told 
the plaintiff that if she would marry him that she would 
never have to go on old age pension (Tr. 102), but the evi-
dence fails to reveal that any premarital agreement was 
ever entered into. 
At the time of the marriage of plaintiff and Greener 
the plaintiff owned a home in Springville, Utah (Tr. 44), 
where she had been living with her sister for several years. 
At that time she was drawing old age pension (Tr. 44, 47-
48). The defendant Greener had been a farmer all his life 
until his retirement, and during some 35 years while he was 
living with his first wife, through rigid economy and scrupu-
lous savings, they had accumulated a home in Springville, 
some United States War Bonds, and the funds involved in 
this proceeding, which, after his wife's death, became his 
sole property (R. 112, Tr. 123). 
Shortly after the marriage plaintiff and Greener went 
to Salt Lake City and Provo, and the defendant caused the 
plaintiff's name to be entered on each of the savings ac-
counts owned by him, and from that time on until after 
the first divorce their names appeared on said accounts as 
Thomas R. Greener or Amy E. Greener (R. 112-114). 
The defendant Greener during his lifetime was close-
mouthed concerning his financial affairs, and until his mar-
riage with the plaintiff even his children did not know the 
extent of his holdings (Tr. 102-103, R. 116). 
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Shortly after the marriage of plaintiff and Greener, de-
fendant's children learned of defendant's holdings and of 
the fact that plaintiff's name had been entered on the bank 
records. Considerable difficulty arose between the plain-
tiff and Greener, and they determined to secure a divorce. 
They conversed as to the amount of money the defendant 
Greener should give to the plaintiff, and finally settled on 
the sum of $2,000. They then went to the offices of Mr. 
Roylance and Mr. Terry, who represented Mrs. Greener, 
and filed sUit for divorce. It was difficult for counsel to 
find grounds upon which to base a divorce. None were 
found for the defendant, and the action was eventually filed 
on December 17, 1946, in which the plaintiff herein sued 
the defendant Greener for a divorce on the grounds of im-
potency of the defendant (Tr. 79-80, 87-88). 
A decree was entered in that action on December 19, 
1946 (Tr. 23) and (R. 148-149). Plaintiff received the sum 
of $2,000 in cash, and thereafter the parties went to Salt 
Lake City and had the plaintiff's name withdrawn from 
all of the accounts (R. 113, 149). 
Plaintiff used this $2,000 in modernizing and remodel-
ing her own home (R. 149). 
From that time until April 3, 1947, the parties lived 
separate and apart, but communicated with each other at 
various times respecting the resumption of their marital 
status. On that date the parties appeared in court and re-
quested that the decree be set aside and the action dismissed. 
Such was the order of the court, and thereafter the parties 
again went to Salt Lake City and plaintiff's name was re~ 
entered upon the records and passbooks of the depositories. 
Difficulty again arose between the parties, and the defend-
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ant, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, with-
drew all of the funds and turned them over to his son, 
James Aften Greener, hereafter referred to as Aften, who 
was made a party to this action ( R. 149) . 
The resumption of the marital relationship and there-
entry of the plaintiff's name on the passbooks and their 
agreement to begin again where they had left off was un-
dertaken upon the same conditions and in the same man-
ner as the marriage in the first instance (Tr. 54-55). 
On December 22, 1947, there was on deposit in the 
various accounts in Salt Lake City, Utah, the sum of $18, 
151.46 (R. 113). In addition thereto there was also a joint 
checking account in the Springville Banking Company in 
Springville, Utah. The deposit books were kept in the book-
case in the home of the parties, within easy access of the 
plaintiff, but that nevertheless plaintiff at no time claimed 
any interest in such fund or in said checking account, nor 
did she at any time write any checks against said checking 
account or make any withdrawals from the savings account 
(Tr. 54, 107). 
Although plaintiff claimed to have made inquiry at 
each of the depositories as to whether placing her name on 
the· records and passbooks gave her the same rights as the 
defendant had, no such inquiry was ever made (Tr. 51-53, 
107, R. 149). 
Although Greener testified that he had transferred his 
money to the defendant Aften, and that he had no other 
property other than his home (Tr. 112, 124), nevertheless 
he at no time refused to support the plaintiff, nor did he at 
any time fail to support her until after all the funds were 
all impounded by the court and after the bonds were all 
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exhausted, and during all of this time it would have been 
possible for the defendant to have supported the plaintiff 
(Tr .. 13~-140). 
The defendant Greener did not state to the plaintiff 
that he would feed her and that was all she would get, but 
on the other hand told her " I will feed you and give you 
all you want if you will stay here" (Tr. 110-111). 
The testimony is conflicting as to whether or not the 
defendant Greener made the statement about there being 
three less people in the world, but if the same were made 
the fact is clear that it was not communicated to the plain-
tiff until after the plaintiff filed her complaint and this ac-
tion commenced (Tr. 87). 
The sole purpose and intention of the parties in placing 
the plaintiff's name on the various bank books of the de-
pos_itories was to avoid probate, and neither of the parties 
at any time considered that plaintiff owned any present in-
terest in said funds (Tr. 122, 130). The defendant is the 
sole 0\vner of the funds referred to as on deposit in the 
various depositories, and his withdrawing them was not 
fraudulent, and constituted no cruelty as against the plain-
tiff (R. 150). 
At no time during said marriage has the plaintiff been 
denied by the defendant any necessities of life, nor has the 
defendant at any time denied the plaintiff any requested 
requirements for her personal needs (Tr. 48-49, 109-110). 
In addition thereto, there were in the home of the parties 
on various occasions small luxuries, such as candy and 
fruits (Tr. 97). 
The defendant further told the plaintiff when she was 
about to leave him that this was her home, and she could 
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stay there, and that he would supply her everything she 
wanted (Tr. 146, 110-111, R. 150). 
The defendant at no time during the said marriage 
held the plaintiff up to ridicule or shame, nor did he at any 
time do any act or fail to do any act which he could have 
done which could have caused the plaintiff mental anguish 
or bodily suffering, and at no time during said marriage 
between plaintiff and defendant did the defendant wield a 
knife or make any threats toward the plaintiff, nor did- the 
defendant commit any other acts of violence during said 
marriage (Tr. 109) . 
Plaintiff did make a trip to California on or about De-
cember 20, 1947, and at such time defendant Greener gave 
her ample funds to defray her expenses, and she returned 
with $5.00 unspent (Tr. 117, R. 150). 
Although defendant Greener filed a cross complaint, 
he later stated that he did not want a divorce, and that he 
was willing to resume marital relations (Tr. 147-148, 154). 
ARGUl\:IENT 
Counsel for the appellant, in their brief, have gone to 
great lengths in pointing out the apparent contradictions 
in the defendant Greener's testimony. The complete ans-
wer to this is that the testimony must be viewed in its en-
tirety, with relation to the issues in the case. We might 
take the time of the court, and added space, in our brief 
in pointing out just as numerous and as serious contradic-
ti~ns _i~. the plaintiff's testimony with respect to vital facts, 
but likewise. we think this testimony should be considered 
as a whole in relation to the issues of the case. 
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We suggest to this Court, as stated in numerous de-
cisions, that the trial court is in a better position to con-
sider the demeanor of the witnesses in order to reconcile 
any apparent inconsistencies, and that in our case the trial 
court has resolved any such discrepancies in favor of the 
defendants and respondents. 
Counsel for the appellant have made fifteen different 
assignments of error. We find, however, only twelve of 
them discussed in their argument-assignments numbered 
5, 6 and 12 having been ommitted. We feel that a number 
of these assignments are practically identical with other 
assignments, and that a!l of them might be discussed under 
three points which we feel are the only issues involved in 
this case. 
I 
Did the trial court err in holding that plaintiff was not 
entitled to a decree of divorce? 
II 
Did the trial court err in failing to award to the plain-
tiff any of the money contained in the bank accounts here-
tofore mentioned? 
III 
Did the trial court err in failing to award to plaintiff's 
counsel attorney's fees and costs? 
In the discussion of the issues in the case as referred 
to above, we think it necessary to keep in mind that this 
is a divorce case, and that the matters with respect to the 
moneys on deposit in various banks involved in this litiga-
tion is merely incidental to the main issue of divorce, and 
that if this Court sustains the decree of the trial court no 
further orders or decrees with respect to the money in-
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volved herein are necessary or proper, except that the 
same be released to the defendants. It was upon this the-
ory. that the case was tried to the court below, and this is 
supported by the Idaho court in Trader v. Trader (Idaho 
1930) 285 P. 678. We also call the Court's atteniton to 
Murray v. Murray (Cal. 1896) 47 P. 37. In the latter case, 
even though the plaintiff had designated the matter con-
cerning the transfer of property as a separate cause of ac-
tion, the court still said it was all one cause of action for 
n1aintenance. 
I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A DECREE OF 
DIVORCE? 
Appellant's counsel, in their brief, have claimed six 
acts of cruelty upon which they base their contention that 
the plaintiff and appellant is entitled to a divorce. We will 
discuss these in the same order. 
A. The claimed fraudulent conveyance. 
There is nothing in this record to show that the de-
fendant at any time after the transfer of the funds as above 
set out could not have secured sufficient means with which 
to amply provide for the plaintiff. On the contrary, she 
was fully supported until the parties separated (Tr. 48-49), 
and subsequently thereto until the present time, she has 
received $50.00 per month under order of the court. 
The testimony further shows that even after the trans-
fer of the funds the defendant Greener testified that he 
could have received sufficient money from Aften to amply 
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provide for plaintiff (Tr. 139-140). This is undisputed in 
the record. 
Counsel argues at great length that the withdrawal of 
the funds and the transfer of the same to Aften Greener 
was a fraudulent act, and cite in support thereof the cases 
of Trader v. Trader, and Murray v. Murray, supra. A care-
ful examination of these cases shows that the action was 
brought on the grounds of desertion and failure to provide. 
In each case there had already been a violation of the right 
to support, and the court in each case bases its decision on 
this violation, which was an already accomplished fact, and 
not something to be imagined or conjectured about. In the 
case at bar, the plaintiff had received from the defendant 
a good home, all the necessities of life, and whatever she 
wanted, even though she had had to ask for the same. 
There had been no violation of any marital right by the de-
fendant, even though he had withdrawn the funds on de-
posit and transferred the same to his son. 
We further wish to call the Court's attention to the 
facts in Trader v. Trader, supra. It went to the Supreme 
Court upon a dismissal after the plaiiltiff declined to amend 
after the sustaining of a motion by the defendants. Even 
in that case where, as above stated, it arose upon a failure 
to provide, the court did not actually hold the conveyance 
to be fraudulent, but merely sent the same back for a new 
trial. 
These cases cited by counsel in their brief utterly fail 
to sustain their contention on this point. In support of this 
same contention, appellant's counsel cite Petty v. Petty 
(Idaho 1946) 168 P. 2d 818. A careful reading of this case 
shows that the facts are so dissimilar to the facts of the 
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case at bar that it can have no value. This was a case in 
which the minor child was attempting to force a reconvey-
ance of property conveyed by his father. We wish to point 
out that even here the court did not actually find that the 
conveyance was fraudulent. The case is decided on the 
basis of a statute allowing amendments, and is reversed to. 
allow the defendants to amend their pleadings. In any 
event, it involves the right of a minor to support by his 
father, which can not be compared with the marital right 
of the plaintiff, who has in this case filed suit for divorce 
and might, under rules laid down in Pinnion v. Pinnion (92 
Utah, 255) be denied any right to further alimony or sup-
port, depending upon the circumstances surrounding the 
marriage. 
Appellant also relies upon the case of LeStrange v. 
LeStrange (1934) 242 App. Div. 74( 273 N. Y. S. 21) to 
support her contention that the withdrawal of the funds by 
Greener was fraudulent, contending that this extinguished 
the right of inheritance of the plaintiff. In the LeStrange 
case, however, there was no action for divorce, and the 
husband appeared and testified as a witness on behalf of 
the plaintiff. It appeared that the marriage at the time 
the suit was brought was satisfactory, and that the hus-
band and wife therein were living happily together. The 
court seemed to rely heavily upon this fact, saying: 
"There has been no interruption of the marital 
relation, and the wife testified that they were living 
happily together at the time of the trial. The three 
sons are the only litigants seeking to support the trust 
agreement.'' 
It further appeared from the facts in LeStrange v. 
LeStrange, supra, that the husband had been subject to co-
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ercion and pressure by his children to set up the trust 
agreement involved in that action. The appellant in the 
case at bar has attempted to extinguish any right of in-
heritance she may have had by filing a complaint for di-
vorce. There is no intention on her part to live with the 
defendant tmtil her right of inheritance matures. Hence, 
her claim that the withdrawal of the funds violated that 
right is without foundation, and the case of LeStr-ange v. 
LeStrange, supra, has no application to the contention of 
the appellant that the withdrawal of the fw1ds was fraudu-
lent. 
Counsel for appellant next cite Payne v. Tatem 
(1930) 236 Ky. 306, 33 S. W. (2d) 2. Again we point out 
to the Court that this case deals with the right of inheri-
tance, and the decision of the court was to the effect that 
the gift should be set aside only to the extent of the wife's 
distributive share in her husband's estate. 
The court further indicates that had evidence been 
produced as- to the source of the funds involved, the deci-
sion may have been different, even as to the wife's distribu-
tive share. It therefore follows that this case has no appli-
cation with respect to the matter of fraud in withdrawing 
the funds by the defendant in the case at bar. 
Counsel then cite Blodgett v. Blodg.ett (1932) 266 Ill. 
App. 517, to support their contention of fraud. In this case 
the plaintiff was seeking to recover property fraudu-
lently transferred by her husband during. his lifetime. The 
only distinguishing feature in this case is that the husband 
was found to be guilty of forgery, along with his brother and 
sister, in the transactions complained of. In any event, 
the case again dealt with the surviving widow's right to in-
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heritance, and therefore, in our view, has no application. 
We next discuss the case cited by appellant of Bodner 
v. Feit (1936) 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N. Y. S. 814. The 
facts in this case, we think are so dissimilar to the one at 
bar that it can have no application to the point under dis-
cussion. We do, however, point out that in this case and 
in all the New York cases the decisions are colored by spe-
cial decedent's estate statutes in which dower is entirely 
abolished and certain rights in lieu thereof set up to take 
effect after death. It is interesting to note in this case that 
Justice Untermyer wrote a very well reasoned dissenting 
opinion, in which he contends that, even under their stat-
utes, a husband has the right to convey his property, and 
that there would be no fraud whatever in so doing, and he 
cites a number of cases to that effect. 
It would, therefore, seem that the cases heretofore dis-
cussed clearly enunciate the doctrine that before a trans-
fer of funds or property can be considered fraudulent, it 
must have violated a marital right, and that violation 
must have occurred at the time the transfers are complained 
of. In the case at bar, as we have previously shown, there 
was no violation of any marital right at the time this ac-
tion was commenced. 
We will later discuss in more detail plaintiff's claimed 
interest in the funds on deposit. We turn now to the ques-
tion posed by appellant's counsel on page 26 of their brief, 
DID THE ACT AMOUNT TO CRUELTY? We feel that 
that question is fully answered in the negative by plaintiff 
in her testimony on cross examination. We refer to page 
56 of the transcript, where her testimony was as follows: 
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"Q. Now you told counsel, Mrs. Greener, that you have 
been made nervous and extremely unhappy? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that all because of the fact Mr. Greener had 
failed to give you any money, or is it because of the fact 
that you weren't getting along? 
A. Well I guess it was because we wasn't getting 
along, and the things, the threats he would make and that. 
Q. So your paramount interest in this thing wasn't 
the money in the banks? 
A. No sir. I pron1ised him and he promised me if 
we went back to one another we would be honest with one 
another, and he wasn't honest with me. 
Q. Did you- promise to be a good wife to him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And to take care of him and help him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And do you think you have done that? 
A. Yes sir, I do." 
It is quite obvious from the foregoing statements of 
the plaintiff that there could be no cruelty arising from the 
transfer of the funds by Greener, inasmuch as there was 
no mental anxiety or unhappiness caused thereby .. 
B. The alleged accusation of r~bbing him of $2,000. 
In considering plaintiff's allegation that the defendant 
Greener accused her of robbing him of $2,000, we must 
first determine whether or not the plaintl.ff has carried her 
burden of proving that the statement was made, and if it 
were made, whether it caused her great mental distress or 
suffering, and whether or not it held her up to ridicule and 
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shame. The only evidence in the record that Greener ever 
made such an accusation was the plaintiff's statement to 
that effect, and as against that we have Greener's denial 
(Tr. 115). Appellant's counsel points out that Greener in 
open court made the statemen.t that the plaintiff robbed 
him of $2,000. We suggest that this was after plaintiffs 
amended complaint was filed, and could not have caused her 
any ridicule, shame, and great mental suffering or anguish, 
such as would support the allegations in her complaint. We 
therefore submit that the plaintiff has failed with respect 
to this allegation in carrying the burden of proof necessary 
to establish the fact that this accusation was made, and 
that even if the same had been made, that she suffered any 
great mental anguish, or was held up to ridicule or shame. 
C. Alleged constant quarr.eling over return of $2,000. 
We suggest that, in connection with this allegation, 
the court failed to find anything concerning the quarreling 
over $2,000 that would constitute cruelty, and there is cer-
tainly nothing in the record to justify a finding that such 
ever did take place, or that the plaintiff suffered any men-
tal distress thereby. 
In the case of Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Utah 147, 152 
P. 2d 426, cited by counsel for appellant in their brief, we 
wish to quote from the concurring opinion of Chief Justice 
Wolfe, at pages 154-155, as follows: 
"A wise trial judge with an understanding of hu-
man nature and a sympathy toward the plight of the 
parties will sense from the evidence whether the re-
lationship is worth trying to salvage or whether it were 
better to permit each to go his own way and what the 
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effect would be mentally and physically on the parties 
if the relationship continued. That is why contrast 
or comparison of this with seemingly similar cases may 
not be worth much. In divorce cases especially, seeing 
the parties in court, noting how they react to each 
other, inadequate as is such opportunity when com-
pared to what might be ascertained by an observer of 
the whole dran1a of the marriage, is still immeasurably 
superior to our merely viewing the cold record." 
D. Alleged threats by Greener. E. Alleged knife e.pisode. 
Again we submit that the only evidence of threats and 
the knife episode are the statements.of the plaintiff, which 
were denied by Greener (Tr. 109), and the court found that 
the knife episode never occurred, and that there were no 
threats as clainled by plaintiff (R. 122-~23, 150L Plain-
. . 
tiff testified that the knife episode took place shortly after 
the resumption of marital relations following· the first di-
vorce (Tr. 55). This, according to her testimony, would 
be near the first of -1\fay, 1947. · Yet she failed to attach 
sufficient importance to the matter to make· any complaint 
to anyone that such had taken place, and continued to live 
with the defendant, and even asked him to accompany her 
to California just before Christmas of the same year ('fr. 
117). She did not make complaint until January, 1948, 
after she had found that defendant had transferred the 
funds on deposit in the various banks mentioned elsewhere 
in this brief. Her actions and conduct from the time short-
ly after she went back to Greener up until the filing of the 
complaint the following January testify eloquently that 
"the knife- episode never did occur. · We 'think it bad. ·.taste 
to characterize the plaintiff's testimony as perjury. It is 
sufficient to point out the obvious inconsistency. 
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Appellant's counsel refers to a conversation alleged 
to have occurred between plaintiff's grandson and Greener. 
We think it sufficient to point out that if this conversation 
occurred it was never called to plaintiff's attention until 
after her amended complaint for divorce was filed. In fact, 
as we will show by the testimony of plaintiff's witness, Wal-
ter Mories, it is questionable whether said alleged conversa-
tion took place until after the divorce was filed. There 
was no knowledge, and therefore no fear or anxiety on the 
part of plaintiff by reason of this alleged conversation at 
the time this divorce was commenced. She therefore can-
not use this as a ground of cruelty to support the allega-
tions in her complaint. 
In support of the above, we quote from Walter Mories' 
testimony on cross examination (Tr. 60): 
"Q. When did you say this was, Mr. Mories? 
A. It was some time after my grandmother come 
from California, I don't know the date. 
Q. After Christmas? 
A. Yes, I believe it was after Christmas. 
Q. Was it after she filed for a divorce? 
A. I don't know when she filed. 
Q. You don't know whether it was after or before? 
A. No, I don't." 
\Ve further quote from the testimony of plaintiff on 
cross examination (Tr. 86-87): 
"Q. Isn't it correct that the first time you went to an 
attorney or ealle.d an attorney was after you discovered 
that the money had been transferred from the banks? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And then you called first, I believe, Mr. Roylance 
and you couldn't get him, and you called Mr. Sumsion; isn't 
that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And when you talked to Mr. Sumsion you didn't 
say anything about this episode you have just testified to, 
about your grandson's conversation with Mr. Greener, did 
you? 
A. No, I didn't know about it then. 
Q. And the only thing you talked about was the 
banks, the money in the banks? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And as a matter of fact that was the thing that 
was uppermost in your mind at that time, wasn't it; isn't 
that true? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And as a matter of fact you had left Mr. Greener 
and had started your divorce action before you. found any-
thing out about this conversation with your grandson and 
Mr. Greener; isn't that true? 
A. Yes, sir." 
F. Conversation between plaintiff and Greener about his 
feeding her. 
We submit that the court, in finding against the plain-
tiff on this matter, was amply justified. We have only the 
plaintiff's statement that Greener told her she could stay 
there and he would feed her and that's all she would get, 
or she could get out of it, it didn't make a bit ·of difference 
to him. As against this, we· have Greener's version of the 
conversation, as follows (Tr. 110-111): 
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"Q. Now you heard Mrs. Greener testify that, or words 
to this effect, that she could stay there and you would feed 
her, or she could get out, it didn't make any difference 
to you. Did you make any such statement? 
A. I talked with her and begged .her when she was 
going, I told her to stay rigbt there. She was going home. 
She wanted. me to go and get a neighbor to bring his car 
and take her home. I said, ''You are home right here." 
''Now," I said, "stay home and fulfill your promises that 
YO:U made." Lsaid, "I will feed you and give you all you 
want if you will stay here." 
Q. And that is the way it happened, the way you have 
testified? . 
A. That's it. 
Q. So you didn't say, "I will feed you and that's all 
you will get" ? 
A. No, ;nothing of that ever happened." 
We think Greener's version of the conversation, as 
above set out, is the more logical way in which it took place. 
In this matter, as in the other instances heretofore dis-
cussed, the trial court had the parties before it, could 
observe their demeanor, the manner in which they testi-
fied, and was .in position to determine the truth· of the tes-
timony. 
As further proof that the plaintiff. suffered no mental 
distress or <:tnguish wh\le living with the defendant Greener. 
we have the· testimony of ·p~lairitiff's sister, Sarah Nelson, 
as follows (Tr. 68-69): 
~ :. , "Q. And have you::be.en ·living with her ever since she 
left Mr. Greener -early·in January? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Been living in her home? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I take it you were living in her home prior to that 
time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now what have you observed with respect to Mr8. 
Greener's action, her health, her mental condition, since 
she has left Mr. Greener in January? 
A. Well I have noticed that she gets up in the night 
and she will cry, and her head aches so much worse, and 
she is so nervous. She is terribly nervous. 
Q. Had you observed her condition prior to that 
time? 
A. Well, not so much, no sir. 
Q. Well you did observe her prior to the time; you 
had seen her quite frequently, hadn't you_? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now what was her condition prior to that time 
as compared with it after she left Mr. Greener? 
A. Well, I noticed her nervousness and all that since 
she left more than before." 
The above quoted testimony of the plaintiff's sister 
clearly indicates that the mental anguish and suffering, if 
any, on the part of the plaintiff occurred subsequent to 
their separation, and not as a result of any acts or conduct 
on the part of the defendant Greener. 
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QUESTION OF WILLINGNESS OF DEFENDANT 
TO RESUME MARITAL RELATIONS. 
Here appellant's counsel has taken one instance in de-
fendant's testimony and attempted to prove his point from 
that statement. As appears in many other instances in his 
brief, he has failed to consider the entire record, or even 
the whole testimony of any one witness. At best, it is ques-
tiomible whether or not the testimony quoted by appellant's 
counsel in their brief, at page 34, sustains their contention. 
We· think the same can be construed to mean that marital 
relations could be resumed if the two were brought together. 
There are a number of statements in the record definitely 
refuting counsel's argument in this regard. We refer the 
Court to Greener's testimony on cross examination .(Tr. 
147): 
"Q. Do you think you and Mrs. Greener could go back 
and live together happily? 
A. We would have to do different than we done be-
fore if we did. 
Q. Unless she would do different than she did before 
you couldn't maintain your relationship with her, could 
you? 
A. Why not? 
. ~ _ Q.. Could you, unless she did something different? 
A. I don't see why." 
And again (Tr. 149): 
"Q. Now if Mrs. Greener were to come back to you, 
how would you provide for her, Mr. Greener? 
A. That would be my lookout. 
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Q. That would be your lookout? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You don't wish to qualify that statement to go 
into it any further? 
A. I would do what I said I would do. I told her that 
I would give her all she wanted, when she left me the last 
time. I told her if she would stay I would give her all she 
wanted." 
There are numerous other statements in the testimony 
to like effect, and it would only prolong this brief to quote 
them verbatim. 
Counsel for appellant has cited several Utah cases in 
support of their contention that this Court should substi-
tute its findings for those of the trial court.· A careful read-
ing of these cases reveals that they not only fail to sustain 
their position, but, on the contrary, strongly support the 
opposite. We quote from Steed v. Steed, 54 Utah 244, 181 
P. 445, at pages 249-250: 
"While, if we were controlled by what appears 
from the fact of the record, we should feel inclined to 
reverse the judgment and to grant plaintiff the relief 
he seeks, yet in this, as in most cases, there are many 
things that transpire at the trial which cannot be cor-
rectly reflected in cold print." * * * * "Nor, in view 
of all the facts and circumstances, are the conclusions 
of law and judgment so clearly wrong as to authorize 
us to set them aside in a case of this kind. We feel 
constrained to hold that the district court had a right 
to exercise some discretion in the matter, and that it 
exercised that discretion wisely." 
We suggest that in the case at bar there is nothing in 
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the record to justify this Court in disturbing the findings 
of the trial court. 
As heretofore pointed out, the appellant has failed to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations 
set out in her second amended complaint, upon which she 
relies as grounds for divorce, and has failed to meet the 
requirements as laid down in Cordner v. Cordner, 91 U. 
466, 61 P. 2d 601. 
As heretofore mentioned, we take the position that the 
question as to the rights in the funds is only incidental to the 
action for the divorce, and that if the divorce be denied the 
Court is no longer concerned with the rights of the parties 
in those funds. However, in the event the Court does not 
agree with our position, we now proceed to discuss the 
issue of the relationship of the parties to the funds in ques-
tion. 
II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO 
A WARD TO THE PLAINTIFF ANY OF THE MONEY 
CONTAJINED IN THE BANK ACCOUNTS HERETO-
FORE MENTIONED? 
In considering the above point, it is necessary to call 
the Court's attention to certain facts regarding the funds 
under discussion. Prior to the marriage of plaintiff and 
Greener, the latter was the sole owner of the funds above 
referred to, they having been on deposit in various banks 
throughout the State of Utah. They were all accumulated 
by Greener and his former wife· during their long married 
life· together, ·and there were no contributions by the plain-
tiff to said funds. It also appears that Greener at all times 
had exclusive control over the funds. This is shown by the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
undisputed fact that Greener made all checks and signed the 
same, and made all withdrawals from said accounts, and 
that, although the passbooks were kept in the home of 
plaintiff and Greener, plaintiff at no time made any atten1pt 
to take them into her possession. 
We further submit to the Court that at no time prior 
to the separation of the parties in .. Tanuary, 1948, did the 
plaintiff make any clain1 to said funds. On the contrary, 
she treated them at all times as the sole property of Green-
er. \Ve refer the Court to the following testimony given by 
plaintiff on her direct examination (Tr. 22-23): 
"Q. Well now, did you have any conversation with Mr. 
Greener shortly after that with respect to filing a divorce 
proceeding? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what was that? 
A. Well, he asked me if I would get a divorce. He 
said that if I would get a divorce maybe his children would 
come back to him and treat him decent again. And he said, 
"If you get a divorce I will help you pay for it; I will give 
you more money than you have ever had in your life be-
fore," he said. And I asked him how much he had to give. 
And he said, "I will give you five hundred dollars." And 
I said, "No sir, I won't go for five hundred dollars." I said, 
"I want a third of what you have got." And he said, "You 
wouldn't get it." I said, "Would you give me five thousand 
dollars?" And he said, "No." And I said, Would you give 
me three thousand dollars?" And he said, "No." I said, 
"Would you give me two thousand?" And he said, "Yes, 
I will give you two thousand dollars if you will get the di-
vorce.'" 
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Would the plaintiff have made such statements if she 
had claimed a half interest, or any part of said funds as her 
own? The answer is obvious. She would not. 
The record is replete with similar instances showing 
beyond all doubt that plaintiff at no time prior to the first 
divorce claimed any present interest in said funds. Was 
the situation any different after the resumption of marital 
relations? 
We again refer to the plaintiff's testimony on direct 
examination (Tr. 23): 
"Q. Now what occurred after that divorce? 
A. Well, he came back and wanted me back. He 
made those promises all over to me again. And we went 
to Salt Lake and had my name put on those books again." 
In several other places the plaintiff stated that the 
same promises were made to her again, indicating that the 
same conditions prevailed as prior to the separation, and 
that the marriage relation was resumed on the same basis 
as in the beginning. One of these is as follows (Tr. 50): 
"Q. But you did go to him and asked him for all that 
you had, didn't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And felt that that was the right thing to do? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that true all the time you lived with him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. That ·was the precedure .from the beginning to end, 
was it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And he was still the same with respect to buying 
groceries and other household necessities even up until the 
time you left him? 
A. Yes, sir." 
vVe also have the plaintiff's direct statement as fol-
lows (Tr. 54-55) : 
"Q. Then with respect to your testimony, Mrs. Green-
er, the situation as far as the second time you went back 
to Mr. Greener was no different than the first time you 
married him, was it? 
.. . . . 
Q. It was the same situation, wasn't it, Mrs. Greener? 
A. Yes, sir. He promised me the same things over 
again that he did the first time." 
Plaintiff further indicated her attitude toward these 
funds in her testimony on direct examination at (Tr. 162): 
"Q. Now you have heard Mr. Greener testify today that 
upon the occasion of your visit to California at the end of 
last year he gave you $60.00 to use as expense money for 
the trip. Is that true? 
A. No, sir. He gave me $30, a $30 check he wrote 
out for me. 
Q. Is that all he gave you? 
A. He gave me my train fare.'' 
We further wish to point out that the last testimony 
above quoted was concerning the trip to California which 
was taken but a few days prior to their separation and the 
filing of this divorce action. 
When we add to the foregoing, the testimony of Green-
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er that the only reason for placing plaintiff's name on the 
accounts was to avoid probate, and that there was no in-
tention that she should ever have any part of such funds 
prior to his death, and the further fact that although she 
characterized Greener's conduct as stingy and niggardly, 
she had access to the passbooks representing said accounts, 
yet made no attempt to withdraw any funds from these ac-
counts, but relied wholly upon what he was willing to give 
her, and testified that she thought this was the proper thing 
to do, can there be any doubt that there is clear and con-
vincing proof sufficient to overcome any presumption that 
might arise from placing the plaintiff's name on the joint 
tenancy cards of .the various banks where the funds were 
deposited? N.eill v. Royce, 101 U. 181, 120 P. 2d, 327. 
The trial court, in holding that the test of clear and 
convincing proof as required in the Neill case, supra, had 
been met, made a very careful and exhaustive analysis of 
that case, and the rules therein enunciated were applied to 
the case at bar (R. 118 and following). The court also dis-
cussed the following, in addition to the matters hereinabove 
referred to: the settlement in. the prior divorce action in 
the sum of $2,000. We feel that the significance in that 
settlement was the plaintiff's haggling and bargaining with 
Greener, first for one-third of the funds, then for $5,000, 
then for $3,000, and finally settlement for $2,000, with no 
thought or mention of a one-half interest in the funds on 
deposit. And further the plaintiff herself testified that the 
situation was no different after the resumption of the mari-
tal relationship. 
The trial court also discussed the allegation in plain-
tiff's complaint concerning the return of the said $2,000. 
At this point we submit that had the parties considered the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plaintiff as having any present interest in said funds, it 
would have been quite unnecessary to quarrel about the 
return of any amount. 
Counsel relies heavily on the cases of N usshold v. 
Kruschke (Ore.) 159 P. 2d 819, and Tabola v. Wholey (Cal.) 
170 P. 2d. 952, 956. In the Tabola case, supra, the decision 
of the court is based upon a joint venture in which both par-
ties had contributed both in money and services to the prop-
erty involved. When differences arose the one party with-
drew all the funds. The court, in applying the law to these 
facts, would not go behind the joint agreement. In our 
opinion, this case is clearly distinguishable on its facts from 
the case at bar, but in any event the rule laid down in the 
case of Neill v. Uoyce, supra, which is the law in Utah, al-
lows the court to go behind any such agreement and deter-
mine the real intentions of the parties. 
In Nusshold v. Kruschke, supra, the husband, before 
his death, withdrew from a joint account $5100 and placed 
it in a joint account with the defendant. In reaching its 
decision, the court found that there was no evidence what-
ever to rebut the presumption of the joint accounts. On 
the contrary, it was undisputed that the money, or the 
greater part thereof, came from the sale of the home, which 
had been held by the plaintiff and her former husband as 
tenants by the entirety. The facts in this case are so dis-
similar that this decision again has no effect in determin-
ing the questions involved in the case at bar. 
In further discussing the question as to whether the 
plaintiff acquired any present interest in the funds, we di-
rect the Court's attention to the case of Wood v. Wood, 87 
Utah 394, 49 P. 2d 416. In this case the defendant, Jennie 
Wood, deposited the funds in the bank in the name of Jo-
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seph Wood by herself as· Guardian, and the question arose 
as to vyhether or not there was a valid gift which could be 
enforced by the plaintiff upon reaching his majority. From 
the facts therein presented the court found that no such 
gift was intended, but that the account was opened so that 
when the defendant died any money remaining in the ac~ 
count would go to the plaintiff without necessity of pro-
bate. We think this case goes far beyond anything in the 
case at bar, and although not entirely identical in its facts, 
yet is persuasive in determining the question under. discus-
sion. At this point we refer to Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 
___ Utah , 184 P. 2d 670, in which the plaintiff 
and defendant sought a . determination of their property 
rights in a divorce proceeding. The facts in this case paral-
lel the facts in the case at bar, in that the parties were 70 
years of age and their marriage was a second marriage 
and of short duration. The property involved was real es-
tate instead of personal property, but the significance with 
respect to the said property is the fact that it was held in 
joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, and in making 
division of the property the court disregarded the joint ten-
ancy ·as giving either party any interest therein, and con-
sidered only the fact that the original purchase price had 
been paid by the plaintiff, and that the defendant had made 
certain contributions toward remodeling and improvements, 
and upon these two considerations the award was made. 
We also direct the Court's attention to the case of 
Foreman v. Foreman, U 176 P. 2d 144, cited 
by appellant's counsel in their brief. In that case also there 
were bonds held in joint tenancy, as well as a joint bank ac-
count, and the court made its property award without re-
gard to the joint interest of the parties thereto, but cited 
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the case of Pinnion v. Pinnion, supra, as controlling in de-
termining the amount of the award to the wife, irrespec-
tive of the fact that the property was in joint tenancy. 
QUESTION OF ALLEGED PREMARITAL AGREE-
MENT. 
Appellant's counsel, in their brief, contend at great 
length that there was a premarital agreement, and that 
appellant would not have married Greener except for the 
alleged promises with respect to his property. Counsel also 
spent much time and space in his brief, and has cited sev-
eral cases to the effect that the statute of frauds must be 
pleaded as a defense, and that the purported agreement 
was without the statute of frauds. A complete answer to 
this argument may be found in the record of the testimony 
itself, in which the plaintiff stated that she did not marry 
Greener for his money, nor because of any agreement in 
connection therewith, but because they had promised each 
other that they would live together as a husband and wife 
should. We refer the Court to plaintiff's testimony on di-
rect examination (Tr. 18): 
"Q. Now I ask you at this time, Mrs. Greener, whether 
you would have married Mr. Greener if it hadn't been for 
this promise to turn this money over to you? 
A. Yes,--
A. Yes, I would have married him the first time with-
out promises of the money." 
And again on cross examination (Tr. 43-44): 
"Q. And he told you he had thirty thousand? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And he told you it was in the banks? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At that time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Told you which banks it was in? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And in what form it was in, as far as accounts 
were concerned, did he? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q.. Is that the reason you married him at that time? 
A. Well no, not the first time it wasn't for his money 
I. married him. 
Q. So you married him because you wantec,l to marry 
him and live with him at that time? 
A. And take care of him like he wanted me to. 
Q. And take care of him and be a good wife to him, 
is that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that was the only thing you had in mind then, 
wasn't it Mrs. Greener? 
A. Yes, sir." 
And again on cross examination (Tr. 46-47): 
"Q. And didn't you promise him then you would come 
back and make him a good wife? 
A. Yes, after these other things he had promised me, 
these other promises, I made him that promise. 
Q. You promised that. That is, you wouldn't want 
to have come back, come and live with him unless you could 
have congenial marriage relations, would you? 
A. I don't know what you mean. 
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Q. If you knew you weren't going back and live like 
a man and wife should, you wouldn't have gone back, 
would you? 
A. No, sir; we made them pron1ises to one another 
that that is what we would do." 
\Ve further at this time direct the Court's attention 
to the testimony of the plaintiff, heretofore quoted, in which 
she stated that the situation was no different after the re-
sumption of the marital relations than it was before. Upon 
these and all other testimony of the plaintiff heretofore 
set out, as well as the entire record itself, we submit that 
the appellant has wholly failed to prove any premarital 
agreement upon which any present rights in the funds re-
ferred to could be based. 
QUESTION OF IMPRESSING A TRUST IN FAVOR 
OF GREENER. 
The foregoing, under the rule laid down in Neill v. 
Royce, supra, leaves no room for doubt that the plaintiff 
acquired no interest in the funds on deposit in the various 
banks as herein discussed, and that the trial court commit-
ted no error in holding that the funds were the sole prop-
erty of the defendant Greener, and as an incident thereto 
Aften holds the same in trust for Greener. We feel that 
this could very well settle the entire matter. We will pro-
ceed, however, to a brief discussion of the argument by 
counsel for appellant on the question of impressing the 
funds with a trust in favor of Greener. Appellant's coun-
sel argue that the trial court in effect dismissed the cross 
complaint of Greener, and that there is nothing in the plead-
ings upon which to base any affirmative relief on behalf 
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of either the defendant Greener or the defendant Aften. 
We need only refer the Court to the answer filed in behalf 
of both defendants, and particularly that part of the prayer 
as shown at (R. 108), which reads as follows: "Cross com-
plainant prays for such other and further relief as to the 
Court may seem just and equitable." Counsel for appel-
lant refers to the court's finding No. 14, and assumes the 
same to have dismissed the entire pleading. This seems 
to us to be an unwarranted stretch of the imagination, 
as the court merely found that the defendant Greener wants 
no divorce, and is willing to resume marital relations (R. 
150). 
We here call the Court's attention to the case of Wheel-
wright v. Roman, 50 U. 10, cited in appellant's brief to sus-
tain their contention that no relief could be granted the de-
fendant Greener. As we have heretofore pointed out, the 
defendants, in their answer, asked for general relief, and 
we quote from W~elwright v. Roman, supra, as follows: 
"That, in case general relief only is asked, any re-
lief that is supported by the pleadings, and the evidence 
may be granted, is well settled." 
As to the case of Cain v. Stewart, et ux., 47 U. 160, also 
cited in appellant's brief to support the same contention, we 
suggest' that this case has no application to the point under 
discussion. This case merely holds that a judgment for 
more money than is prayed for cannot be sustained. The 
court merely said in effect that the trial court must have 
made a mistake in its arithmetic, and sent the case back 
with instructions to figure the correct amount and enter 
judgment accordingly. 
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Another case upon which appellant relies is the case of 
Saint v. Saint (Cal. 1932) 7 P. 2d 374. Counsel for appel-
lant, in discussing this case, state at page 38 of their brief: 
"the court in setting aside the conveyance as 
fraudulent said." 
We disagree with counsel that the court in this case set 
aside any conveyance or transfer of property, and we point 
out that this case would only have application in the case 
at bar, first, if there were actual fraud on the part of Green-
er, which we have shown did not exist, and, second, if Green-
er were suing Aften to establish a trust. There is no con-
troversy between defendants Greener and Aften. On the 
contrary, Aften has acquiesced in the trial court's decision 
and has joined with defendant Greener as respondent, to 
uphold the decision of the lower court. 
Again in the analysis of the case of Jolly v. Graham, 
22 Ill. 550, 78 N. E. 919, relied upon heavily by the appel-
lant, we suggest in that case, first, that there was no doubt 
concerning the fraud committed, and second, that the plain-
tiffs were heirs of the party who committed the fraud, and 
hence had no greater rights than the transferor would have 
had had he been the complainant. Therefore, to make this 
case applicable the defendant Greener would have had to 
enter suit against his son Aften, and we refer to our re-
marks above in connection with Saint v. Saint, supra. 
In our argument herein we have shown beyond all 
doubt that the funds were the sole property of Greener, 
therefore whether or not a trust is impressed upon the funds 
in favor of Greener should be of no concern to the appel-
lant. 
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III 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO 
AWARD PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ATTORNEYS' FEES 
AND COSTS? 
We think it unnecessary to point out the amount of 
work performed by counsel on either side of this case. The 
only question, it would seem to us, is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying the appellant an at-
torney's fee. We call the Court's attention to the fact that 
counsel for appellant did receive the sum of $100.00 as fees 
in the proceedings prior to the appeal in this case. An 
-award of attorney's fees in divorce cases is entirely within 
the discretion of the trial court, even when the plaintiff is 
the prevailing party. The trial court in the case at bar 
exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff any further 
attorney's fees in its decree. Appellant has pointed out 
p.othing in this case to show an abuse of such discretion, 
especially in view of the fact that the defendants were the 
prevailing parties. 
Counsel's position that $1,000.00 was stipulated as a 
reasonable fee for _the services of plaintiff's counsel on ap-
peal is not quite correct. Respondents' counsel did indi-
cate that no objection would be raised to $1;000.00 attor-
neys' fees for the entire appeal, provided, that counsel for 
appellant is entitled to be paid by the defendant any fee at 
all. We take the view that the defendants should not be 
required to pay any fees for appellant's counsel, but that 
she should pay her own counsel fees. We think there was 
no error committed by the trial court with respect to this 
matter. 
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CONOLUSION 
In conclusion, we submit that this is a divorce case, 
and that the rights in the funds involved are merely inci-
dental thereto. We further submit to the Court that the 
evidence was ample to support the trial court's findings 
that the plaintiff had not sustained her burden of proof 
with respect to her action for divorce, and was not entitled 
to any part of the funds in controversy, nor is she entitled 
to the imposition of a trust on any part of said funds for 
her benefit, and that she should pay her own counsel fees, 
costs and expenses. 
We also submit that the application of the equitable 
doctrine of "clean hands" has reference only to the plain-
tiff or other party commencing an action, and can have 
no effect upon the defendants in this case, who were 
brought into court by the appellant, and we suggest that 
the appellant had better carefully scrutinize her own con-
duct, which is apparent in the record of this case. It neces-
sarily follows that the findings and decree of the trial court 
should be sustained and affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARNOLD C. ROYLANCE 
ELMER L. TERRY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
Received...._ _____ Copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondents, this day of January, A. D. 1949. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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